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Gender pay gap, voluntary interventions, and recession: the case of 
the British Financial Services Sector 
Abstract  
State institutions and trade unions put pressure on the British financial 
services sector to reform its gendered practices and reduce its gender pay 
gap following both the recession and the Equality and Human Rights 
Commission (EHRC) Inquiry (2009). This article considers the effect of 
these pressures by comparing the gender pay gap pre-, during- and post-
recession periods. Using Labour Force Survey data, the article finds a 
marginal pay gap reduction in the post-recession period, a reduction that 
was greater in financial services than in the rest of the economy.  However 
the financial services pay gap remained resilient and substantially higher 
at the top of the earnings distribution. Union membership and collective 
bargaining were shown to reduce the pay gap including for women 
members with children.  In contrast, countervailing factors, including 
ethnicity and post-recession longer working hours, contributed to the pay 
gap. The study reveals the limitations of voluntary interventions against 







It is ten years since the 2008/9 recession and when financial services was 
required by the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) (2009) to 
voluntarily reform its gendered practices including its gender pay gap, bonus 
and gendered culture. It is particularly timely to revisit financial services’ 
gender pay gap in the light of the UK Government’s aim to ‘eliminate the 
gender pay gap within a generation’ (Government Equalities Office, 2016) 
with pay transparency as a means towards this aim.  Government’s business-
case rationale for focusing on the pay gap is: 
 
Employers are losing out by not effectively utilising women’s 
academic achievements, experience and talents. Equalising women’s 
productivity and participation rates would make a significant positive 
impact on our economy. 
 (Government Equalities Office, 2016:4) 
 
The state viewed pay transparency as one solution to the gender pay gap.   
Initially, voluntary pay gap reporting was required following the Think Act, 
Report (Government Equalities Office, 2015), but did not garner employer 
support.  Secondary legislation followed (section 78 of the Equality Act 2010 
(Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulation 2017) requiring private and 
voluntary sector employers with 250+ employees to report their gender pay 
gap to Government and publicly on organizations’ websites by 5 April 2018.  
While compliance is compulsory, sanctions for non-compliance were unclear. 
Moreover, the lead-up to April 2018 was the first time that the majority of 
organisations examined their pay gaps. This was not the case in financial 
services where a light was shone on its pay gap and equality practices by the 
EHRC Inquiry (2009) and subsequently by the Treasury (2010, 2016, 2018) 
and by unions (see section 2 below).  This study shows the change in pre-, 
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during- and post-recession pay gap, in the context of voluntary interventions, 
and adds to the literature on pay systems post-recession (Stokes, Bryson, 
Forth, & Weale, 2017). It augments our understanding of sector-specific pay 
gap studies as opposed to national or regional studies, (Blau & Kahn, 2017; 
Dex, Ward, & Joshi, 2008; Drolet & Mumford, 2012; Tomaskovic-Devey, 
1993). Moreover, it demonstrates state and union initiatives to change 
financial services’ culture and pay gap. Our rationale for focusing on financial 
services’ pay gap is four-fold: financial services has one of the highest pay 
gaps in the UK; became the subject of public scrutiny and concern following 
the 2008/9 economic crisis; was the subject of an EHRC Inquiry in 2008; and 
has long been recognised for its male gendered culture (McDowell, 2008; 
Özbilgin & Woodward, 2004). 
 
We begin the article by considering explanations for the pay gap offered in the 
literature and consider what the implications these separate but related 
explanations may mean for the financial services’ pay gap. We then outline our 
research questions. Taking a multi-pronged approach (Dickens, 1999), we 
consider financial services’ context, particularly voluntary state (drawing on the 
EHRC Inquiry and subsequent Treasury reports) and union initiatives, and 
financial services’ organisational culture.  We then turn to our empirical 
analysis of the pay gap over time drawing on Labour Force Survey (LFS) data 
followed by discussion and conclusions. 
 
2. Explanations for the gender pay gap 
 
Our investigation is shaped by the various interlinked and overlapping 
explanations of the pay gap. Firstly, gendered differences in human capital 
(Becker, 1985) stress differential investment in skill acquisition and paid work 
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between men and women. Notwithstanding women’s increased investment in 
education and careers, often exceeding that of men, the human capital 
approach still has purchase in the literature (Burress & Zucca, 2004), although 
Blau and Kahn’s (2017:789) US study found conventional human capital 
variables taken together explained little of the pay gap but that occupation and 
industry remained relevant. We might expect that, if salient, a human capital 
approach will relate the pay gap to human capital investments in education, 
marriage, motherhood (rather than parenthood) and to length of service.  
 
Secondly, women and men are often segregated horizontally by doing 
different work and vertically with one sex (male) dominating the hierarchies 
(Charles, 2003), so that wage disparities across male and female occupations 
are explained by gender segregation and devaluation (Murphy & Oesch, 
2015). Dex et al. (2008) showed that women's wages grew more slowly than 
men's wages because they were located disproportionately in lower growth 
and feminized jobs. From this perspective, we might expect not only that 
women in female-dominated areas might have a lower level of pay but higher 
pay when working in male-dominated jobs and, in view of voluntary 
interventions, that there would be a reduction in horizontal and vertical 
segregation over time.  
 
Linked to horizontal and vertical segregation is the third point that workplace 
practices and systems shape gender pay inequality (Rubery & Grimshaw, 
2015; Smithson, Lewis, Cooper, & Dyer, 2004) and relates to our discussion 
on unionisation and financial services’ culture and practices (below). 
Following the EHRC Inquiry, we might expect greater attention from 
managers and unions to workplace practices and pay systems leading to a 




A fourth explanation, interrelated with the above three points, explains the pay 
gap as the result of workplace discrimination. Drolet and Mumford (2012) 
found that a substantial portion of the pay gap in their private sector study in 
Britain and Canada remains unexplained by the individual characteristics or 
workplace. We may expect that discrimination will be a further explanation 
given research on financial services’ gendered organisational practices and 
culture (McDowell, 2008; Özbilgin & Woodward, 2004). 
  
3. Research questions and method 
 
To understand the impact of the EHRC Inquiry in the context of recession, we 
ask the following question and linked sub-questions: what were the changes in 
the financial services’ pay gap for the period 2003 to 2017 (pre-, during-, and 
post-recession) with respect to:  other sectors in the economy; horizontal and/or 
vertical segregation; human capital factors; the influence of workplace practices 
and pay systems including union presence and collective bargaining; and 
observed (endowment) explanations for the pay gap as compared to 
unexplained or discrimination reasons?  
The financial services context was examined to enable an understanding of the 
industrial relations (IR) actors’ approaches over the period.   This involved 
exploratory interviews and focus groups undertaken with union officials and 
the TUC, and document sources from unions and Treasury committees. 
Against this context, we addressed our research questions using a quantitative 
sectoral investigation outlined in section 5. 
 
4. Financial services context 
 
In 2008, financial services employed 4 percent of the British workforce and 
provided 1.3 million jobsi. The economic crisis led to reduced employment 
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levels of 1.08 millionii and redundancies and weaker unions (Gall, 2017). 
According to the Walker Review (2009) on corporate governance post crisis: 
‘The taxpayer has provided UK banks with nearly £1.3 trillion in 
support  
. . . equivalent overall to some 90 percent of UK GDP. Political, 
taxpayer and social tolerance of practices, including unsafe 
remuneration policies, which led to this calamitous state, is 
understandably low.’ (Walker, 2009: 90) 
 
Financial services were ripe for reform, not least with respect to governance 
and pay. 
 
State Interventions  
State institutions have played a notable role in reforming financial services’ 
equality context since the recession. Yet, Conley argued the state remains 
contradictory, ultimately thwarting legal enforcement of equality when its 
economic authority and the interests of capital are threatened (2012:349). 
Nevertheless, Dickens posits that state intervention is central to an equality 
agenda because the market tends to produce discrimination, not equality 
(1999:13). Thus, we draw specifically on two state institutions which have 
sought to influence pay and equality in the sector, firstly the enforcement arm 
of equality legislation, the EHRC and secondly, less commonly used in IR 
research, the House of Commons Treasury Committees. 
 
The EHRC Financial Services Inquiry and Treasury Committees 
The EHRC Financial Services Inquiry was conducted because of the sector’s 
particularly large gender pay gap and unique barriers for women, including long 
working hours, lack of flexible work, a male-biased culture and the 
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reproduction of differentials among new entrants and because these barriers 
have persisted despite some attempts to tackle them (EHRC 2009). Moreover, 
economic turmoil in the financial sector gave rise to fears that inequalities were 
being exacerbated (EHRC, 2009:22). EHRC used its legal powers under section 
16 of the Equality Act, which include mandatory disclosure powers, to access 
information. The Inquiry is a voluntary mechanism without sanctions, which 
arguably seeks to shame the sector into action. The subsequent EHRC report 
made a series of recommendations for increased transparency, improved 
leadership, better support for staff with caring responsibilities, more consistent 
monitoring of the pay and progression of people from different backgrounds, and 
a clearer articulation of the business-case for ‘getting this right’ (EHRC, 2009:7). 
While the Inquiry recommendations are not legally binding, there is an 
expectation based on EHRC findings and recommendations that organisations 
‘must have regard to our recommendations’. The powers, which require 
voluntary compliance rather than regulated compliance,  are seen to stimulate 
change (Hepple, 2011) but signify some ambiguity.   
Following the EHRC Inquiry,  Treasury committees paid attention to 
financial services. Benton and Russell (2013) found that such committees 
strengthen the policy-making process inside and outside government by 
exposing decision-making to rigorous tests and encouraging careful 
consideration of options. The 2009-10 Treasury Committee (2010) focused 
on sex discrimination in financial services drawing on the business-case 
rationale by acknowledging the need for change to improve corporate 
governance and oversight within large financial institutions. Part of the 
debate on corporate governance focused on the lack of diversity on the 
boards of financial institutions, which ‘may have heightened the problems of 
'group-think' and made effective challenge and scrutiny of executive 
decisions less effective’ (2010:3). Implicit was the view that more women 
decision-makers may have avoided the recession.  
8 
 
A further Treasury initiative led to a review by Gadhia (2016) which 
recommended that executive bonuses are explicitly tied to achieving greater 
gender balance (2016:47).  A key focus was the establishment of the Women 
in Finance Charter (owned by HM Treasury, 2016:9). Signatories to the 
Charter voluntarily commit to: women’s progression into senior roles, and to 
publicly report on progress to support transparency and accountability to drive 
change. The Charter was underpinned by a clear business-case philosophy 
arguing that ‘A gender balanced workforce is good for business – is 
increasingly being sought by investors, employees, members and customers’ 
(2016:74). Signatory firms determine voluntary targets and are committed to 
implement four key industry actions to improve women’s representation in 
senior management.iii  
Financial services organisations.  
Multiple sources of evidence reveal that the financial services’ culture has 
long disadvantaged women (Banyard & Lewis, 2009; McDowell, 2010; 
McDowell & Court, 1994; Özbilgin & Woodward, 2004). The compilations of 
Davies’ media reportsiv provide further indications of the resilient hostile 
culture for women in finance.  More recently, culture continued to figure 
strongly in the Women in Finance Report (Treasury Committee, 2018) which 
received the majority of written evidence from financial services’ 
organisations (p.45-46).  The Report continued to find cultural issues, 
including women’s treatment, bonus culture and presenteeism, persistent 
concerns and noted that gender and other equalities are not key business 
objectives (Treasury Committee, 2018). Moreover, it asserted that the ‘Alpha-
Male’ was evident in bonus culture, presenteeism and unconscious bias 
through persistence of stereotypes and assumptions. Again in the mode of 
voluntarism, the Committee encourages the financial services sector to 
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consider gender diversity as core to business strategies and to uphold gender 
diversity as a priority (2018:21). 
 
The evidence provides a dispiriting picture of an organisational culture 
resistant to change.  Nevertheless, financial institutions have made attempts to 
tackle their ‘alpha-male’ culture, primarily through their diversity and 
inclusion units. A striking exemplar is Lloyds Banking group’s Inclusion & 
Diversity Strategy which has top level support with Group Executive 
Committee members championing the agenda. Lloyds’ strategy to improve the 
pay gap is to increase the proportion of women in senior roles so that ‘the 
gender gaps will reduce over time’ (Lloyds Banking Group 2018). Actions to 
achieve this aim include: a target of 40% senior women by 2020; shortlists to 
be diverse; agile hiring to encourage broader working patterns; a ‘returners’’ 
programme; training in agile working and unconscious bias; and a women’s 
leadership programme.  This strategy has received external recognition: 
Lloyds was named as: ‘Best bank in the world for diversity and inclusion 
2017’ Euromoney Award; Times Top 50 Employer for Women (2018) plus 
multiple awards for championing gender diversity including top employer for 
working families by Timewisev. However, the transparency regulations 
revealed the average (mean) gender pay gap per hour at banks and building 
societies in the UK is 35 percent and the average (mean) gender pay gap for 
bonuses at banks in the UK is 52 percentvi.  Despite their prize-winning 
diversity initiatives, Lloyds’ Banking Group (2018) reported an average mean 
pay gap figure of 32.8%  with a bonus gap of 65.2%  which is higher than 
average for the sector. Pay gap differences were explained by women’s under-
representation in senior levels. Thus, while diversity initiatives are important 





Key actors in the dynamics of the gender pay gap are unions, which seek to 
ensure that equality structures and policies are not separated from IR structures 
and processes.  Pillinger's (2014:4) ETUC study indicated that national level 
unions have been instrumental in fighting for and implementing legislation to 
improve pay transparency, for example through company level pay audits, pay 
surveys, equality plans and income reports.  The major union with recognition 
in UK financial services is Unite the Union with 130,000 members, an 
estimated union density at 20 percent and collective bargaining at 25 percent 
(Prosser, 2011). A union wage premium has been associated with high union 
density (Addison, Portugal, & Vilares, 2017), wide coverage of collective 
bargaining and multi-unionism (Forth & Millward, 2002). Historically, the 
wage premium was associated with men as the ‘insiders’ in the union, however 
women now outnumber male unionists (Kirton & Healy, 2013) including in 
Unite. Studies also indicate that unionization generally reduces wage 
inequality, but the effect might be contingent both on the proportion of women 
in an industry, on union characteristics and employment conditions (Achatz, 
Gartner, & Gluck, 2005; Elvira & Saporta, 2001; McGuinness, Kelly, 
O'Connell, & Callan, 2011).  Moreover, Gall (2017) argues that financial 
services’ unionism was being overwhelmed by challenges from employers 
pursuing policies based on HRM, partnership and union exclusion and 
significant restructuring of the sector. Thus, we cannot presume that unions will 
always have a positive gender effect on the union pay premium. 
At organisational level, exploratory interviews with union officials indicated a 
clear relationship between collective bargaining and equality audits: 
‘The collective bargaining agreements (with major banks) give us  . . . 




‘Our work is, you know, eternal vigilance, to keep the pressure on them 
through the kind of consultative and negotiating structures we have with 
them, to hold them to account, to make sure some of the very if you like 
progressive policies that their diversity and inclusion managers talk 
about are actually put into practice’ 
The interviews indicated that unions and financial services organisations are 
adopting integrative/consensual bargaining (as outlined in  Williams and 
Baird’s (2014:163) equality bargaining review) through ‘routine’ sharing of 
data and regular communications, monthly or quarterly meetings on equality 
including pay gaps and bonuses.  
‘we get routinely now is all the data showing the amount of the 
performance pay rise people have had versus gender, age, ethnicity and 
so on, the amount of bonus they’ve had, you know, so on average, 
compared across each grade.’ 
Officials informed us that bonuses are discretionary so ‘we don’t get to 
negotiate that (bonuses)’ but they see the statistical patterns with lower grades 
(where women are concentrated) receiving 10 percent but at the male 
dominated higher grades it may be 40 percent plus. Moreover, union officials 
outlined how the equality climate had shifted from negative to more pragmatic 
with respect to the pay gap:  
. . . there is a grudging acceptance that the way in which banking and 
finance has been done and by whom it’s been done has to change.  
The transparency regulations were cautiously welcomed and a community 
response was seen as crucial: 
‘ as long as stakeholders like the trade unions and civic society and 
others and academics hold these corporate entities to account and make 
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sure they do what they are required, legally required to do, then yeah, I 
think that will have a benefit. . .’ 
Turning to union engagement with their representatives, Unite has introduced 
practical step-by-step guidance on undertaking equality audits, a systematic 
approach to raise awareness and encourage union representatives to engage 
with their employers on gender equality and  
‘assist all Unite Reps including Union Equality Reps, in negotiating with 
the employer to find out what the situation is in the workplace, how to go 
about tackling unequal pay between men and women and ensuring that 
pay systems are transparent’ (UNITE, undated).    
Unite also gave evidence to the Women in the City Report (2010) highlighting 
the long hours’ culture; opaque pay systems - performance/market related pay, 
bonuses, wide pay bands, anomalies in starting pay and managerial pay; a 
reluctance to consider managerial roles on a part-time or job-share basis; 
attitudes to working women; lack of access/encouragement to career 
development and training; and the ‘old boys’ network’ (2010:Ev46). As the 
post-recession period took hold, unions were dealing with the fall-out of 
redundancies. Unite’s 2014 survey found that long hours’ working had 
intensified; unpaid work beyond agreed contractual hours  increased with 74 
percent of members experiencing  job losses where they work and 60 percent 
of remaining workers working longer hours, three quarters of whom were not 
paid overtime (Survation, 2014).  However, no gender analysis was available. 
The survey led to a campaign that ‘Unpaid hours are not acceptable’ with 
linked posters and leaflets.  By focusing on decent pay, the union is alert to 
injustice and goes beyond the pay gap focussing on the Living Wage, low pay, 




A crucial difference between unions’ and state pay gap strategies is that unions 
are more likely to adopt a social justice (see conference motionsvii) framing 
rather than the business case framing of state institutions. The above 
discussion indicates that the conversation on gender equality has intensified 
among key IR actors since the EHRC Inquiry. Given the attention received by 
financial services including from Treasury Committees and unions holding 
financial organisations to account and in the wake of the transparency 
regulations with respect to the pay gap and gender segregation, we might 
reasonably expect change over time.   
 
 5. Empirical models 
  
Our empirical analysis starts with a widely used Mincer type earning function 
(Mincer, 1974). In this, pay gap is measured while using (log) hourly pay as a 
function of female dummy, human capital and job-specific characteristics.viii 
A negative coefficient would indicate a gender pay gap. To decompose the 
contribution of important factors on pay gaps, we use a standard Oaxaca-
Blinder (OB) decomposition technique at the mean proposed by Oaxaca 
(1973) and Blinder (1973), which has become the key reference for 
decomposition of pay gaps (Rubery & Grimshaw, 2015, p. 325). This 
approach estimates the raw pay differentials in the expected value of male and 
female (log) hourly pay separately for men and women. The pay differentials 
are then decomposed into two parts (see suppinfo for details). The first part is 
the endowment effect, the explained part of the pay gap that is due to the 
differences in observed characteristics at the mean, which is weighted by the 
coefficients attributable of men. The second part is the unexplained 
component of pay gap that arises due to the differences in wage between 
genders attributable to the gender differences in coefficients including 
intercepts. This unexplained part often called the discrimination effect, i.e. the 
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unequal wage for equally qualified workers (Blau & Kahn, 2017). As the 
unexplained part includes the effects of labour market discrimination, 
unobservable variables (e.g., motivation), and omitted variables, we recognise 
that particular care should be taken when interpreting the model residual as 
discrimination (see Ahmed & McGillivray, 2015).  
 
However, pay gaps differ at the lower and upper tails of the wage distribution 
(see Chzhen & Mumford, 2011). Therefore, to explore pay gaps in lower- and 
upper-income brackets, and thus identifying the existence of “sticky floor” or 
“glass ceiling” effects in financial services, we conduct OB type decomposition 
at selected quantiles. We apply the unconditional quantile regression based on 
Recentered Influence Function proposed by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2009) 
(for details, see Borah & Basu, 2013; Green, Heywood, & Theodoropoulos, 
2014; Heywood & Parent, 2012).  
 
Data and descriptive statistics 
We draw data from the LFS for the period 2003Q1 to 2017Q2. The Office for 
National Statistics conducts the LFS with a panel design. Each sampled 
address is interviewed for five waves, and each wave takes place at three 
monthly intervals where the fifth wave takes place a year after the first. LFS 
data advantages are its large sample size and large range of variables often 
consistent for a long time series. Limitations are that LFS data are self-
reported, leading to possible inconsistencies in response and do not capture 
non-wage benefits that increase with seniority.ix   
 
First, a respondent is retained in our sample if s/he is employed at the time of 
the interview (including the self-employed), and also if their age is between 16 
and 64 (inclusive). We exclude those who are inactive to avoid obfuscating our 
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analysis by including early retirees and those on long-term sickness benefit 
(Clark & Lindley, 2009; Nickell, 2004). Second, we collect gross hourly pay 
information for each of the respondents in their main job. The definition of each 
variable is in suppinfo table B1. The final sample contains observations of 
30,460, of whom 14,213 are men and 16,247 are women. We deflate all 
monetary values to 2015 (2015 = 100) prices using the UK quarterly consumer 
price index. The set of explanatory variables that are used include age (8 
categories), education (6 categories), ethnicity, tenure, occupation (9 
categories), marital status (3 categories), dependent children (5 categories), 
training, and establishment size (8 categories). 
 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of selected variables for men and 
women by sub-sample periods: pre- (2003q1-2008q1), during- (2008q2-
2009q2), and post-recession (2009q3-2017q2) periods.  It shows that real 
hourly pay of women increased more (£1.85) compared to men (£0.85) from 
the pre-recession to post-recession period: the differences are statistically 
significant at 1% level. Differences in educational qualifications between 
genders are also striking: taking pre-recession period, we observe that there 
were 48% women compared to only 25% men in the lower three categories of 
educational qualifications, which had decreased to 39% for women and 20% 
for men in the post-recession period. The opposite had happened in the case of 
the highest two categories of educational qualifications: there were 26% (46%) 
of women (men) in the pre-recession period compared to 37% (56%) in the 
post-recession period. These differences are also statistically significant. This 
suggests that after the global financial crisis, the gender-based gap in education 
is declining (though not vanished) in financial services as more educated 
women are participating in the sector. Moreover, there is also a stark difference 
in occupations between the genders over the sample period. For instance, 
comparing the pre- and post-recession periods, the number of women in the top 
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three occupations has increased by 107% as opposed to 56% of men: in 
particular, women have gained mostly in the professional and technical jobs – 
a 44-percentage point increase for women. Though a decreasing trend is visible 
for both genders in the case of managerial or senior level positions, women have 
observed a 10% lower decline compared to men. In the post-recession period, 
52% of women, as opposed to 20% of men, are in only two occupations (Sales 
and Customer Service and Administrative and Secretarial) (see Olsen, Gash, 
Kim, & Zhang, 2018 for similar findings). Men are more concentrated in the 
professional and senior-level positions, implying vertical segregation in 
financial services. Although still considerable, we see some softening of 
horizontal and vertical segregation and the gendered acquisition of human 
capital.  
 
Regressions and Decomposition 
 
Raw and conditional pay differentials 
Table 2 shows the difference between the average real hourly pay for men and 
women. The raw pay differential was 41.3 percentage points in the pre-
recession period, indicating a wage differential of 51%
  exp .41 -1 ×100 = 51%) ; men earned 49% more than women during-
recession period, and it further decreased to 44% in the post-recession period, 
indicating a 7-percentage point reduction in gender pay gap over the sample 
period. To understand whether the difference in the pay gap between periods 
is statistically significant, we run a Chow test. We find that the differences 
between the coefficients of Female in the pre- and post-recession periods is 
significant at 1% level (p-value = 0.001), but insignificant in the pre- and 
during-recession periods (p-value = 0.25), suggesting that the differences in 




To get conditional pay differentials, we pooled the sample to run an OLS 
regression while controlling for various economic attributes: these attributes are 
key to influence the relative pay of women compared to men. The coefficient 
on the ‘female’ dummy variable shows the conditional wage differentials, 
indicating the unexplained portion of the pay gap after controlling for individual 
characteristics. The average conditional pay gap has also reduced over the 
sample period; in pre-recession period, women on average earned 19% less than 
men; it had decreased to 16% during-recession period and further reduced to 
14% in the post-recession period. Put differently, taking post-recession gender 
pay differential, women earn almost 14 pence less than every £1 earn by men.  
 
The ’unsafe remuneration practices’ in financial services were under severe 
scrutiny during the recession (Walker 2009). As bonuses came down in the 
recession period, so did the pay gap. As men in financial sector get the lion 
share of bonuses compared to other sectors, it leads to an interesting question 
of whether pay gap declined in rest of the economy during-recession. To see 
the changes in pay gap, we run additional regressions taking the sample of all 
sectors, excluding financial services. The unreported result shows that pay gap 
decreases during-recession in the rest of the economy too, but the decrease was 
1.6-percentage point more in Financial Services, suggesting that the decline in 
bonuses might be one potential contributor.  
 
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
Table 3 reports the results of the decomposition of OLS estimates at the means 
for three sub-sample periodsx. The gender pay differentials corroborate with the 
earlier raw pay differentials and confirm a marginal reduction in pay gap in 
financial services. To explore the factors that may have contributed to the pay 
differentials, the OB decomposition is decomposed into two parts. Taking post-
recession sample, the value 0.250 of endowment effect suggests that the 
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differences in the observed characteristics, age, education, occupation, and 
establishment size account for 68% (=0.250/0.365) of pay differentials, which 
could be reduced if women had the same characteristics as their men 
counterpart. Whereas, the discrimination effect that resulted from the 
differences in the unobserved parts between genders accounted for 32% of the 
pay gap, which was 38% in the pre-recession period. The reduction in the 
discrimination effect indicates some change in financial services. 
 
The contribution of education and occupation on the gender pay gap 
The observed factors that contributed most to the endowment effects are 
education, occupation, and establishment size. In the post-recession period, 
they explain 20%, 71%, and 8%, respectively, suggesting that higher 
educational qualifications, managerial positions, and jobs in large companies 
are important determinants to reducing gender pay gap. The contribution of 
education and occupation to the pay gap changed little over the sample 
period.xi The unreported detailed decomposition reveals that most of the shift 
comes from degree qualification and professional and managerial categories 
of the occupation (see discussion above). Therefore, the results indicate that 
the greater number of highly educated women in professional and managerial 
positions is a critical factor in reducing gender pay differentials in financial 
services. On the other hand, our unreported results for post-recession sample 




Table 4 reports the results of distributional decomposition of pay gap using the 
unconditional quantile regressions for selected quantiles
(   .10,  .25,  .50,  .75,  .90)q  . Predictably, the estimated pay gap is higher at 
the upper tail of the distribution. Though the post-recession pay gap at the 10th 
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quantile is still 0.129 log points (or 13.8%), it reaches 0.462 (or 58.6%) at the 
90th quantile. The results of pre- and during-recession periods are also similar. 
This result is consistent with Chzhen and Mumford (2011) who find a similar 
effect for the British employees working full-time in 2005. In line with Bell and 
Van Reenen (2014), we find that greatest inequality is at the top of the wage 
distribution so that women who break the glass ceiling pay a substantial wage 
penalty in financial services. The reasons that might widen the pay gap at the 
top earnings distribution may include firstly, the unconscious bias favouring 
promoting male colleagues to the top and secondly, that women might be more 
reluctant to take up top executive positions given the gendered culture. Either 
of these possibilities suggests an inherent discriminatory environment for 
women in financial services. Our finding indicates that policymakers need to 
target different segments of the pay distribution to reduce the pay gap. 
 
We find that the endowment effect is positive for all three sub-sample periods. 
It increases up to 25th quantile and then decreases along the earnings 
distribution. However, the differences diminish from the 50th quantile. It 
suggests that the differences in productive characteristics contribute to pay gaps 
in the lower quantile. A large part of the contribution to endowment effect at 
the 90th quantile is by education and occupation.   
 
Returning to the discrimination effect, we find negative coefficients up to the 
25th quantile. It suggests that women at the bottom pay distribution face less 
earnings discrimination. However, the coefficient turns positive and increases 
along the earnings distribution from 50th-quantile.  It indicates that women on 
top of the earnings distribution are subject to more discrimination. It implies 
that the differences in unobservable characteristics are the main drivers in pay 
gaps at the top of the wage distribution. The discrimination effect at the 90th 
quantile has marginally decreased (2 percentage points from 70% in pre-
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recession to 68% in the post-recession period). This decrease may be due to the 
increasing number of educated women working in financial services who took 
up professional and technical jobs (see Table 1). 
 
 
Long working-hour and bonuses 
Financial Services’ long working hours’ culture is closely linked to inequalities. 
(EHRC, 2011; McDowell & Court, 1994).xii  Therefore, we collected data on 
individual’s weekly working hours and added this variable in the 
decomposition. Columns 1-3 of Table 5 shows the results. For brevity, we 
present the results of the effects of endowment, discrimination, and the newly 
added variable. Even after controlling for log(# hours worked), we find that 
there is a decline in the discrimination effect over the years. However, in 
contrast to the observed factors discussed above, log(# hours worked) 
contributes 7% to the endowment effects in the pre-recession period, which has 
increased to 10% in the post-recession period (with 60% unexplained), 
indicating that post-recession increase in long working hour practice supports 
Unite’s findings (Survation 2014). In addition, we find the increase in long 
hours has worsened the gender pay gap. 
 
Since the global financial crisis, performance related pay/additional payment 
in the form of bonuses in financial services have been in the limelight, 
although often not engaging with gender differentials.  Bell and Van Reenen 
(2014) finds that increased bonuses and substantial bonus size in financial 
services,  (relative to other sectors) accounts for the wide pay gap at the top of 
the wage distribution.  Moreover, Stokes et al. (2017:20) revealed that the 
wages of high-earning performance pay workers continued to grow faster 
during-recession than fixed pay British workers. Our concern is to explore 
whether additional payments in the form of bonuses widen gender pay 
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differentials. Since LFS data on additional payment in the form of bonuses is 
limited due to respondents’ non-responses, these results should be treated with 
caution.  We have re-run decomposition using a reduced sample: Columns 4-6 
of Table 5 reports the results. In the pre-recession period, the contribution of 
bonuses on endowment effect was 8%, which has reduced by 3 percentage 
points in the post-recession period. However, the post-recession result 
suggests that 5% gender pay gap, which increases to 7% and 10% at the 75th 
and 90th percentiles respectively, could have been reduced if women had 
bonuses similar to their men counterparts. Therefore, further initiatives need 
to be made in financial services to diminish gender pay differential due to 
bonuses.   
 
Membership of trade unions 
As LFS collects respondents’ trade union membership information only in the 
October-December wave of the survey, we have limited observations to run OB 
decomposition for our sample period. In this case, we consider two union 
variables: (i) if an individual is a member of a trade union; and (ii) if 
pay/conditions are affected by union agreements. We augment our baseline 
decomposition with these two variables and decompose again. Columns 7-9 of 
Table 5 report the results. Regarding endowment effects, the variables related 
to trade union suggest that while being a member of a trade union could reduce 
pay gap by 3% in the post-recession period, the pay differentials could also have 
been reduced by 3% if pay/conditions was affected by union agreements (which 
was 3% and 6% in the pre-recession period, respectively). The results also show 
that even after controlling for trade union and collective bargaining factors, the 
discrimination effect has reduced over the sample period in Financial Services. 
Our unreported regression result shows that women with children who are trade 
union members, on average, earn higher wages, especially during- and post-
recession periods, indicating some equality bargaining success for unions by 
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reducing the pay gap. This finding is noteworthy given that average wage for 
women with children rose by 2.3 percent in contrast to 12.6 percent for those 
without children. 
 
A quasi-experimental approach 
Considering the publication of EHRC report as a unique event to the financial 
services, we apply difference-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) approach as 
described in Wooldridge (2007). In our case, there are two control groups; 
therefore, DDD estimator is an appropriate choice as it performs differences-
in-differences estimation in each case. The effect of EHRC report on wages is 
identified by comparing log(hourly pay) of men and women (first difference) 
in the treated sector (financial services) to the people in the control sectors (rest 
of the economy) (second difference), before and after the treatment, that is, 
EHRC report on 2009q3 (third difference).xiii Table 6 reports the DDD results. 
It shows that female wage has increased by 2.6% in Financial Services 
compared to the rest of the economy after the publication of EHRC report. In 
other words, gender pay gap has reduced by 2.6% in financial services 
compared to other sectors in the economy. The result even improves after 
controlling for all characteristics, time dummies, and sector dummies (full 




6. Discussion and conclusion 
 
We began the article by suggesting that espoused concern at ‘unsafe 
remuneration policies’ (Walker, 2009) and the EHRC’s (2009) public exposure 
of the high pay gap, poor equality practices and job segregation in financial 
services might lead to positive change and a reduced gender pay gap. The article 
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has drawn on state institutions, the EHRC and an unusual contribution to IR 
research, Treasury committees’ reports (2010, 2016, 2018), which 
demonstrated a preference for voluntarism, or what Gregory-Smith (2018) 
called self-reforming positive action over formal legislative quotas. Treasury 
committees focused on improving women’s representation in power to 
challenge the ‘group think’ that led the financial services lemming-like fall into 
recession and the consequent  huge cost to the British state of bailing out an 
industry that cannot be seen to fail. Thus, we see the state’s contradictory 
position (Conley 2012) given its preference for voluntary approaches to 
equality, drawing on compulsory transparency when its economic authority is 
threatened, but at the same time being ambivalent on penalties for non-
compliance.  
Our analysis found changes between pre-recession, during-recession and post-
recession years, and overall, we found that the pay gap had declined in the post-
recession period. Moreover, its decline is greater than the pay gap decline in 
other sectors in the economy, suggesting that the multi-pronged attention 
received from different actors in financial services has reaped benefits.  
Nevertheless, the decline is small, and the gender differentials remain resilient 
despite both the recession and increased awareness resulting from the EHRC 
(2009, 2011) Inquiry and subsequent state interventions. 
Our deeper analysis of the different explanations of the pay gap revealed a 
more nuanced picture.  We found a slight softening of horizontal and vertical 
segregation with a smaller proportion of women (and men) continuing to be 
employed in the lower grades. The fall-out from the recession and the greater 
attention to gender in financial services may account for the significant 
increase (44%) of women in professional and technical jobs and the 
decreasing trend for men and women in managerial or senior level positions.  
Moreover, our findings concur with Blau and Kahn’s (2017) view that gender 
differences in occupations and the gender division of labour remain important 
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explanatory factors of the pay gap with occupation positively contributing to 
the discrimination effect. 
Moreover, in line with other studies (Bell & Reenen, 2014; Blau & Kahn, 
2017), our decomposition revealed that women, who have successfully 
reached the higher grades in financial services, experienced a pay gap in the 
upper quartile significantly higher than in the lowest quartile and at the 90th 
quantile the level of discrimination is greater. The irony is that the more 
successful and better paid the woman, the greater the penalty in pay she 
suffered compared to her male comparator. While the pay gap was less at the 
lower earnings distribution (Dex et al., 2008; Bell & Reenen, 2014), it has 
remained almost unchanged over the period. Our findings indicate a decline in 
bonuses in the post-recession period suggesting that the reduction might have 
come about due to public anger and increased scrutiny over bankers’ bonuses 
since the global financial crisis and/or greater attention to bonus-setting 
practices. Nevertheless, the bonus gap remained greatest at the most senior 
levels, where if women got similar bonuses as men, the gender pay 
differentials would reduce.  These findings question the sufficiency of HM 
Treasury Charter strategy and Lloyds’ Bank to increase the proportion of 
senior level women as a means to reduce the gender gap. Moreover, we 
expose the subsequent policy neglect of the resilient pay gap at the lower 
earnings distribution. 
On the surface, human capital effects do help explain why men and women in 
financial services work in different occupations.  However, the relationship 
between high male qualifications with high gender differentials does not 
explain why highly qualified men are recruited and promoted and highly 
qualified women are not.  The proportion of women graduating now exceeds 
the proportion of men graduates.  Rubery and Grimshaw (2015, p. 326) 
challenge the view that women have not graduated in the ‘right’ subjects by 
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pointing to the increasingly high proportion of women internationally entering 
accountancy, economics, medicine and law.  Financial services has 
considerable discretion in how it recruits, whom it recruits, whom it promotes 
and for which occupations – therefore we must conclude that our findings 
further endorse the institutional undervaluation of women in finance and the 
resilience of its discriminatory gendered culture, most recently evidenced by  
the Treasury Committee (2018). 
 
In line with Rubery and Grimshaw  (2015), our study showed that workplace 
practices are imbued with inherent discriminatory elements with the EHRC 
(2009, 2011) and Treasury committees (2010, 2016, 2018) revealing how far 
the sector has to travel to give women equal opportunities, including changing 
workplace practices, systems and culture. Despite repeated studies on the 
negative impact of the gendered culture, the 2018 Treasury Committee still 
found that the ‘alpha male’ is part of the problem. It would appear that even the 
beneficiaries of multiple awards for their diversity work, such as Lloyds 
Banking Group,  reported a broadly average sector pay gap and a much higher 
than average sector bonus gap. It may be that, in line with Kirton et al’s (2016) 
study, diversity is not recognised by line managers who have discretion over 
bonuses and therefore can undermine diversity initiatives where diversity is not 
a strategic priority. 
The study also demonstrated that unions sought control and influence over work 
processes in their persistent push for equality audits, both in bargaining and 
holding financial services’ employers to account, and in their guidance to union 
representatives. Unions also sought political influence through their evidence 
to the 2010 Treasury Committee. Nevertheless, despite some common aims, the 
IR actors had differing interests. Unions emphasised challenging injustice with 
respect to long and unpaid working hours, casualization, low pay as well as the 
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pay gap, whereas the Treasury emphasised the business-case for improving 
women’s representation and reducing the pay gap. 
Union presence and collective bargaining were found to be moderating 
influences encouraging transparency and questioning pay systems. Moreover, 
the study revealed an under-researched premise that union membership led to a 
lower pay gap for women with children. This is likely to be a clear outcome of 
union engagement with pay data and encouraging equality audits with 
organisations and their union representatives.  Despite Forth and Millward’s 
(2002) research showing no demonstrable union wage premium for private 
sector workers in general and declining union density and union coverage in 
finance (Gall 2017), our research has resonance with Elvira and Saporta’s 
(2001) findings that unionization is associated with smaller gender gaps.   
Despite the EHRC (2009) Inquiry highlighting the relevance of long working 
hours to women’s equality, we found that post-recession working hours have 
increased, thus confirming Unite’s 2014 survey results and its evidence to the 
2010 Treasury Committee. Moreover, these countervailing pressures of 
increased working hours and presenteeism have had a negative effect on the 
gender pay gap indicating that if hours continue to lengthen any future reduction 
of the pay gap will be hindered.  
Gender was not the only discrimination effect in our analysis but also 
ethnicity, suggesting that attention to gender alone is not sufficient, but that its 
intersectional relationship with ethnicity is important. This follows recent 
policy and academic interest in the ethnic pay gap (Corlett, 2017; EHRC, 
2017; Green et al., 2014; Heywood & Parent, 2012; Tomaskovic-Devey, 
1993; TUC, 2016) and reflects research findings that multiple protected 
characteristics have a disproportional effect on the pay gap (Woodhams, 
Lupton, & Cowling, 2015; Woodhams, Lupton, Perkins, & Cowling, 2015). 
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 In conclusion, the gendered culture of financial services has been resistant to 
change (Treasury Committee 2018). The multi-pronged forces on financial 
services has elicited only small progress in challenging ‘unsafe remuneration 
policies’ and responding to the EHRC Inquiry. It is evident that despite the 
arguments for change, the 2018 Treasury Committee confirmed that gender 
equality is not a strategic priority for financial services but, again reflecting a 
voluntarist approach, stated that strategies and progress will be monitored 
(2018:21). Our results indicate that the success of HM Treasury Charter 
initiative is contingent on improving women’s representation at senior levels 
but also tackling unfair pay systems and culture-change at all levels of the 
earnings distribution. Notwithstanding the gender equality actions by state 
institutions, organisations and unions that have taken place, albeit, in the 
context of the fall-out from recession, it is hard not to surmise that such 
voluntary approaches are not enough. Does our research have implications for 
the likely success or otherwise of mandatory pay gap reporting? The financial 
services experience suggests that without regulatory sanctions, reducing the 
pay gap is likely to be a slow, fragmented and uneven process and require 
committed employment actors, whether unions, diversity experts, women’s 
networks, to continually challenge financial services’ discriminatory norms 
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Summary statistics, by gender and recession periods 














  Mean Mean Mean   Mean Mean Mean 
Real hourly wage (£) 25.06 27.52 25.91  14.92 16.32 16.73 
Log (Real hourly wage) 3.00 3.06 3.03  2.56 2.63 2.64 
Aged 16-21R 0.04 0.04 0.02  0.06 0.05 0.03 
Aged 22-25 0.09 0.08 0.07  0.10 0.09 0.08 
Aged 26-30 0.15 0.14 0.13  0.14 0.14 0.14 
Aged 31-35 0.18 0.16 0.16  0.17 0.14 0.15 
Aged 36-40 0.17 0.18 0.16  0.16 0.18 0.15 
Aged 41-50 0.25 0.27 0.29  0.24 0.27 0.28 
Aged 51-60 0.11 0.12 0.15  0.12 0.13 0.15 
Aged 61-64 0.01 0.02 0.02  0.01 0.01 0.02 
No qualificationR 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.03 0.03 0.02 
Other qualification 0.05 0.05 0.03  0.08 0.07 0.04 
GCSE grades A*-C or 
equivalent 
0.19 0.18 0.15  0.38 0.37 0.31 
GCE A level or equivalent 0.29 0.28 0.25  0.26 0.25 0.27 
Higher education 0.09 0.07 0.08  0.07 0.07 0.08 
Degree or equivalent 0.37 0.41 0.49  0.18 0.21 0.29 
Ethnicity 0.94 0.91 0.89  0.95 0.94 0.91 
Tenure 0.97 0.98 0.97  0.97 0.98 0.98 
ElementaryR 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 
PP and Machine Operatives 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sales and Customer Service 0.06 0.06 0.06  0.11 0.10 0.10 
Personal Service 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Skilled Trades 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.00 0.00 0.00 
Administrative and Secretarial 0.16 0.15 0.14  0.47 0.43 0.42 
Associate Professional and 
Technical 
0.25 0.26 0.33  0.18 0.20 0.23 
Professional 0.14 0.13 0.22  0.05 0.06 0.11 
Managers and Senior Officials 0.36 0.39 0.23  0.18 0.20 0.13 
SingleR 0.37 0.35 0.33  0.33 0.32 0.33 
Married 0.57 0.57 0.61  0.54 0.53 0.54 
Others 0.06 0.09 0.07  0.14 0.15 0.14 
No dependent childrenR 0.06 0.06 0.06  0.05 0.05 0.05 
Children aged <5 0.15 0.14 0.16  0.13 0.13 0.14 
Children aged 5-11 0.12 0.14 0.15  0.15 0.14 0.15 
Children aged 12-16 0.08 0.09 0.08  0.09 0.10 0.09 
Children aged >16 0.59 0.57 0.55  0.58 0.58 0.56 
Establishment size <20R 0.15 0.12 0.15  0.23 0.25 0.23 
Establishment size 20-49 0.12 0.12 0.10  0.15 0.11 0.13 
Establishment size 50-249 0.20 0.19 0.19  0.18 0.17 0.17 
Establishment size 250-499 0.15 0.15 0.14  0.13 0.15 0.13 
Establishment size 500+ 0.39 0.43 0.42  0.32 0.32 0.34 
Training offered 0.84 0.84 0.55  0.85 0.81 0.53 
Experience: <3 monthsR 0.04 0.04 0.03  0.04 0.03 0.03 
Experience: 3-<6 months 0.04 0.03 0.04  0.04 0.03 0.03 
Experience:  6-<12 months 0.07 0.08 0.06  0.06 0.06 0.05 
Experience: 1-<2 years 0.11 0.11 0.10  0.10 0.10 0.08 
Experience: 2-<5 years 0.23 0.24 0.22  0.21 0.19 0.20 
Experience:  5-<10 years 0.19 0.19 0.22  0.19 0.22 0.21 
Experience: 10-<20 years 0.18 0.17 0.20  0.22 0.19 0.23 
Experience: >20 0.13 0.14 0.13  0.14 0.18 0.18 
N 6,043 1,313 6,857   7,538 1,569 7,140 
Source: Labour Force Survey for various quarters. 




The average hourly pay differential by recession periods  
  Pre-recession During-recession Post-recession 
Raw (log) real  hourly paya -0.413*** -0.401*** -0.365*** 
 [0.010] [0.022] [0.010] 
Conditional (log) real  hourly payb -0.174*** -0.148*** -0.134*** 
 [0.008] [0.020] [0.009] 
Individual- and job-characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.52 0.51 0.49 
Observations 13,581 2,882 13,997 
Source: Labour Force Survey dataset for various quarters. 
Note: Hourly pays are in 2015 pound sterling. Standard deviations in parentheses and robust standard errors are 
in the brackets. (a) While the raw wage differential is obtained by simply regressing (Log) real hourly pay on 
female using OLS regression, (b) the conditional pay differential is obtained regressing (Log) real hourly wage 
on female and various characteristics (age groups, education, ethnicity, job tenure, occupation, marital status, 
establishment size, training, and experience): reference categories are – age group: Aged 16-21; education: No 
qualification; occupation: Elementary; marital status: Single; Dependent children: No children; and establishment 






Summary of decomposition results 
  OLS 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 
  Pre-recession During-recession Post-recession 
Differences in hourly pay 0.413*** 0.401*** 0.365*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Endowment effects    
Age 0.007*** 0.001*** 0.005*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Education 0.048*** 0.065*** 0.049*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Ethnicity -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Tenure -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Occupation 0.187*** 0.183*** 0.177*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Marital status -0.002*** -0.003*** 0.003*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Dependent children -0.002*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Establishment size 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.020*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Training 0.000*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Experience 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.002*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Total 0.258*** 0.271*** 0.250*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Discrimination effects 0.155*** 0.130*** 0.115*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Source: Labour Force Survey dataset for various quarters. 
Note: Decomposition at the mean. Male wages is the reference category. A positive value suggests an advantage 
in favour of males. The explanatory variables are as defined in supporting information, Appendix Table B1. ***, 





Distributional decomposition at selected quantiles for pre-, during-, and post-recession periods  
  Pre-recession   During-recession   Post-recession 
  q = 0.1 q = 0.25 q = 0.50 q = 0.75 q = 0.90   q = 0.1 q = 0.25 q = 0.50 q = 0.75 q = 0.90   q = 0.1 q = 0.25 q = 0.50 q = 0.75 q = 0.90 
Differences in observed hourly pay 0.135*** 0.261*** 0.485*** 0.570*** 0.583***  0.155*** 0.294*** 0.486*** 0.556*** 0.558***  0.130*** 0.273*** 0.464*** 0.502*** 0.462*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Endowment effects                                   
Education 0.003*** 0.040*** 0.067*** 0.075*** 0.064***  0.039*** 0.040*** 0.079*** 0.096*** 0.074***  0.019*** 0.052*** 0.060*** 0.069*** 0.048*** 
Occupation 0.185*** 0.306*** 0.233*** 0.139*** 0.082***  0.131*** 0.305*** 0.208*** 0.138*** 0.088***  0.162*** 0.306*** 0.212*** 0.146*** 0.077*** 
                  
Total 0.218*** 0.365*** 0.315*** 0.240*** 0.174***  0.182*** 0.350*** 0.310*** 0.255*** 0.171***  0.195*** 0.372*** 0.300*** 0.249*** 0.148*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Discrimination effects -0.083*** -0.104*** 0.169*** 0.329*** 0.409***  -0.027*** -0.056*** 0.176*** 0.301*** 0.387***  -0.065*** -0.099*** 0.164*** 0.253*** 0.313*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]   [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]   [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 




Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition: controlling for additional control variables 
  Contribution of hours worked   Contribution of bonuses   
Contribution of trade union and 
collective bargaining 






















Differences in observed (log) 0.404** 0.398*** 0.350**  0.438** 0.323*** 0.364**  0.424** 0.506*** 0.325**
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Endowment effects            
Log(# hours worked) 0.020** 0.046*** 0.028**         
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]         
Bonuses     0.024** 0.013*** 0.013**     
     [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]     
Member of trade union         0.007** 0.014*** 0.008**
         [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Pay/condition affected by         0.017** 0.028*** 0.008**
         [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Total endowment effects 0.274** 0.308*** 0.273**  0.282** 0.237*** 0.251**  0.273** 0.319*** 0.250**
 [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]  [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]  [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 
Discrimination effects 0.130** 0.090*** 0.077**  0.157** 0.085*** 0.113**  0.151** 0.187*** 0.074**
  [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]   [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]   [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] 




The effect of EHRC report on wages in Financial Services Sector (FSS) 
  1 2 3 4 
FSS*EHRC*Female (DDD effect) 0.026** 0.027*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 
 [0.013] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] 
Observations 690,279 690,279 690,279 689,830 
All characteristics No Yes Yes Yes 
Time dummies No No Yes Yes 
Sector dummies No No No Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.50 0.50 0.51 
Source: Labour Force Survey dataset for various quarters. 
Note: Hourly pays are in 2015 pound sterling. Standard errors are in the brackets. The results are based on 
difference-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) estimation. FSS is a dummy variable takes one if UK Financial 
Services Sector, or else zero. EHRC is an indicator variable that takes one in q3 2009 and thereafter, or else 
zero. Female dummy takes one if female. For brevity, all other interaction terms are included, but not reported. 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
i Labour Force Survey 2008: Q3. 
ii Labour Force Survey 2017 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/employmentandemployeetypes/b
ulletins/uklabourmarket/august2017#public-and-private-sector-employment-first-published-on-14-
june-2017 accessed 29 August 2017 
iiihttps://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/519620/women_in_fi
nance_charter.pdf accessed 22 February 2018 
 
iv http://projects.exeter.ac.uk/RDavies/arian/scandals/behaviour.html. Accessed 27 August 2017   
v https://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/our-group/responsible-business/inclusion-and-diversity/ 
accessed 29 August 2018.  
 
vi https://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2018/july/alpha-male-culture-fuelling-gender-pay-gap-in-
financial-services/ accessed 20 August 2018 
vii e.g. 23 November2015, Finance Industrial Sector Conference. 
viii Hourly Pay variable is pre-defined in LFS database – it is constructed by dividing gross weekly pay 
(in the main job) by the total hours worked in that reference week of the survey. For details, see: 
Volume 4: LFS standard derived variables’ 2016, page 209. 
 
ix Methodological issues in the production and analysis of longitudinal data from the Labour Force 
Survey, GSS Methodology Series nr 17; LFS User Guide 2003, Volume 1, Section 11. Accessed 1 
September 2017. 
x We confirm our decomposition results using Juhn-Murphy-Pierce (JMP) type of decomposition 
procedure. It also shows that the total gender pay differentials declined after the recession, consistent 
with Oaxaca-Blinder approach (see suppinfo for details). 
 
xi Detailed decomposition of each of the characteristics and other results is available from the authors 
upon request. 
xii To check gender pay gap in each of the sub-sectors in financial services: (65) Financial 
intermediation; (66) Insurance and pension funding; and (67) Activities auxiliary to finance, we re-run 
OLS regression and find that pay gap exists in each of them (see Table B2 suppinfo). 
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xiii See Appendix B (suppinfo) for a detailed explanation on the DDD approach. See also the evidence 
of the existence of ‘parallel trends’ assumption. 
